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ABSTRACT 
 
Todd Buell: Taming the Archangel: An examination of European level involvement in 
the case of the Hungarian Minority in Romania 
    (under the direction of Gary Marks)  
This thesis examines the role of European actors in the development of minority rights 
for the Hungarian minority in Romania. It focuses on the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (COE), and the European Union 
(EU). The paper studies the minority rights norms that each body has established and 
their means of enforcing these norms. The paper uses Milada Vachudova’s “active 
leverage” theory as a theoretical framework to argue that it was the prospect of European 
Union membership that motivated Romania to establish a liberal minority rights regime. 
As a concluding and comparative element, the paper examines the Republic of Georgia as 
an example of a country with a tense minority situation, but one where EU membership is 
unlikely in the near future. The comparison strengthens the argument that the prospect of 
EU membership helped manifest a liberal minority rights regime in Romania.  
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Introduction:  
 
This essay attempts to answer one main question: What effect have European 
institutions had on the development of rights for the Hungarian minority in Romania? In 
order to answer this question, I will look at the European institutions themselves, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)1, the Council of Europe 
(COE), and lastly the European Union (EU) at how their understanding of minority rights 
has formed post-1989 and then examine how interactions between the Romanian 
government and these bodies have helped to harmonize Romanian minority rights 
legislation within the evolving framework of European norms. Milada Vachdova’s 
"Active leverage/passive leverage" thesis will serve as my main theoretical framework. 
In this essay, I will only focus on European actors. My decision is not intended to 
imply that European actors were, and are, the only important actors in the development of 
rights for the Hungarian minority in Romania. Rather, as Mihaela Mihailescu (2005) 
points out in an incisive essay, domestic factors, specifically the strength and unity of the 
ethnic Hungarian party in the early days of Romanian democracy and this party’s 
usefulness as a coalition partner to the opposition, ensured that Hungarian issues would 
be taken seriously in Romanian politics.2  
                                                 
1 From 1975-1995 this organization was known as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
For the purposes of clarity, I will refer to it by its current name, OSCE, throughout the essay. 
 
2 Due to space restrictions, I cannot give her argument due justice. However for an analysis of minority 
rights development from the perspective of domestic actors, Mihailescu (2005) and Johnson (2002) are 
both worth reading. 
Nevertheless, it is the involvement of European bodies in minority rights 
questions that has allowed rights for the Hungarian minority to be secured in a manner 
that, despite earlier domestically centered attempts, had never previously taken place. 
Lastly, I will concisely examine another case, that of the Republic of Georgia—
one with similar circumstances to Romania regarding minority populations, but without 
the clear prospect of European Union membership. This comparison case helps me argue 
for the abilities of European institutions, and above all the European Union to be 
effective external actors in the development of minority rights and will therefore 
strengthen my argument that they played a role in the development of minority rights in 
Romania.
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The techniques of involvement of European actors: 
 
Before I delve into the specific case of rights for the Hungarian minority in 
Romania, I am going to introduce the European bodies who concern themselves with 
minority issues and the ways in which they evaluate and sanction the state of minority rights, 
not only in Romania, but also throughout Europe. This section will show that European 
institutions did not give top-down dictations to Romania regarding minority rights. Rather 
the bodies first had to reach a consensus themselves as to what minority rights consist of. An 
understanding of the evolution of minority rights within European bodies helps us see not 
only the interactions between Romania, Hungary, and European bodies but can help us to see 
the techniques that European bodies can and could use in future minority rights disputes, 
such as that in Georgia that I will address at the end of the essay. 
 
OSCE: 
One of the most active European organizations on the issue of minority rights is the 
OSCE. Its office of High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) was established in 
1992, “to identify and seek early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, 
stability, or friendly relations between OSCE participating states” (www.osce.org/hcnm). 
The first HCNM was the former Dutch Minister of State Max van der Stoehl and the current 
HCNM is the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus.  
Nowhere in its documents does the HCNM actually define what a national minority is. 
Former Commissioner van der Stoehl addressed this arguable deficiency in OSCE minority 
rights guidelines in the following manner: “The existence of a minority is a question of fact 
and not of definition. (...) First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural 
characteristics, which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which 
usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that 
identity” (Ibid.).  
Van der Stohl is essentially saying that the definition of a national minority, though 
possessing characteristics that he outlines, is fluid and cannot be concretely expressed in law. 
We should remember this expression as we go through the story of European involvement in 
the question of minority rights for the Hungarian minority in Romania. It was not only the 
Romanians and Hungarians who were dealing with the chaos of transforming a country from 
Communism to Democracy, but also European institutions were helping these countries 
conform to standards that western Europe itself had not fully agreed upon. 
The HCNM is independent of the Permanent Council of the HCNM; this 
independence means that the office does not need to obtain the specific support of the 
Permanent Council to get involved in a minority-based conflict between two states. However, 
what it does need is the support of the state (or states) involved in a particular conflict. In the 
specific case of the Hungarian minority in Romania, we will see in the example of Babes-
Bolyai University this procedure of “consent to investigate” was a catalyst in policy changes 
that were largely motivated by an HCNM report. Therefore, when countries are willing to 
engage with the HCNM in a minority rights investigation, the results can be positive for all 
parties involved. 
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Impartiality is another important requirement to HCNM work that is particularly 
relevant in the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania. In the past, European actors had 
intervened in minority questions in Romania. However, often these particular organizations 
were, in fact, countries that had a significant ethnic-kin population in Romania (“Kin state”).3 
Obviously, intervention on behalf of one side is not particularly effective in bringing about a 
peaceful resolution of tensions. Therefore, the HCNM must always be seen as impartial.  
The HCNM uses the principle of “early warning” and “early action” to try to tame 
intensifying minority situations. This mission involves not only alerting states and the OSCE 
Permanent Council of situations that could become violent, but also attempting to discourage 
extremism on all fronts. As the HCNM’s official documentation states, its general goal is to 
“find ways to accommodate minority interests in a way that neither encourages violent 
secession…or forceful assimilation” (Ibid.). As we will see with the Hungarian minority in 
Romania, the toning down of extremist rhetoric on both the Hungarian side, that was 
advocating Transylvanian’s secession, and nationalistic and extremist parties in Romania that 
would use rhetoric laced with ethnic stereotypes and scapegoating as a means to garner votes, 
was essential to improving the situation between the two ethnic groups.  
 
 
                                                 
 
3 “Kin-state” intervention goes back to Austrian or Russian intervention in the 19th century to protect their 
ethnic kin (Verdery 1991) all the way to speeches by Hungarian politicians in the early 1990s that perpetuated 
the Romanian/Hungarian ethnic dispute that, as we will discuss later, had reached a nadir in the late 1980s. 
Another contemporary example is the Russian intervention on behalf of Russian citizens in the Georgian 
“autonomous republics” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which I will discuss at the end of the essay. 
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Council of Europe:  
The Council of Europe (COE) has been one of Europe’s strongest advocates for 
human rights since the end of the Second World War. The end of the Cold War allowed the 
COE to advance human rights throughout the entire European continent. It sensed early in 
the post-Cold War era that ethnic conflict could hinder the consolidation of democracy in 
Eastern Europe and therefore implemented norms that its member states, and potential 
member states, had to agree to.  
This section introduces three important themes in my broader analysis of European 
involvement. First, I mention the normative documents and principles on minority rights that 
the COE has advanced since the early 1990s. Second, I mention the difference in accession 
requirements between the COE and EU, which is important in assessing the “leverage” that 
each European body possesses in minority rights disputes. In brief, the COE tends to admit a 
country early on in its democratic development and then assesses its progress and makes 
recommendations for improvements. The EU, as I will discuss in more detail later, has a 
lengthy and comprehensive list of requirements that candidate states must fulfill before it 
grants membership. An examination of the COE’s post-accession supervisory techniques 
could help to answer a question that I will pose later: How will the EU be able to exercise 
leverage on states that it has already admitted? Third, I note the arbitrator role that the COE 
has played in minority rights disputes between Romania and Hungary.  
One of the Council of Europe’s principal missions since its founding has been the 
promotion of human rights (www.coe.int).4 In this spirit, the COE went to work quickly after 
Communism fell throughout much of Europe to ensure that the human rights standards that 
                                                 
 
4 This specifically means promoting democracy, the rule of law, and on a practical note, abolishing the death 
penalty among its member states.  
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Western Europe had taken for granted could also be applied in post-Communist countries. 
Late 1989 and early 1990 also saw the initial indications that many countries emerging from 
Communism wanted to “return to Europe” and join the major European bodies such as COE, 
EU, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However in many of the eastern 
European countries one of the biggest obstacles to joining the COE was the plight of national 
minorities (Andrescu 1995).  Via Recommendation 1134 and Order 456 of 1990, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the COE provided the Council “with the legal means to guarantee 
minority rights” (Ibid.). Through this decision, the COE charged itself with the responsibility 
for not only protecting human rights in Europe, but also equated the rights of national 
minorities with basic human rights and moving to enshrine minority rights protections into 
law. The COE interpreted its mandate to investigate minority rights to originate from its 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
This document preserves freedom “of thought, conscience, religion, expression, 
assembly, and association” (www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/minorities). An additional legal 
framework that is more directly geared toward minority issues is Recommendation 1201 and 
the Framework Convention on National Minorities (Framework Convention) that was agreed 
to in 1993 and came into force in 1998. Romania ratified the Framework Convention in 
1995. As we examine the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania more closely, we will 
look at the actual text of these documents and how they apply to this particular case. For 
now, however, we will just look at the procedures by which the COE ensures that member 
states carry out appropriate norms.  
The COE uses a system of reporting and evaluation to judge a country’s compliance 
with its norms and to determine if further recommendations are in order. First, a country 
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being evaluated submits a report to the COE outlining the steps it is taking to comply with 
COE norms.  These reports are then read by an Advisory Committee, which issues its own 
report on the minority situation in the country under consideration. The Advisory Committee 
report, plus responses from the state under consideration, then goes to the COE Committee of 
Ministers for a concluding report. It is in this concluding report where the COE makes 
recommendations for improvements to the minority situation in a particular country.  
In addition, the Council of Europe uses the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages as a normative document on minority issues. This document was opened 
for signatures in 1992 and came into force in 1998. Though signing the Charter in 1995, 
Romania has still not ratified the document 
(http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=148&CM=1&DF=&CL=EN
G).  
As we will see, the COE’s techniques for advancing democracy in Europe are 
different from those of the EU because the COE admits a country after the country proves a 
rudimentary respect for human rights and democracy. After membership is obtained, the 
COE continues to work with countries to monitor, and when necessary, improve a country’s 
human and minority rights situation.  
Though some have argued that the COE is weak (Gallagher 2001:389), it is not 
unthinkable that if a country significantly reneged on its commitments to human or minority 
rights, that the COE could curtail its privileges within the body.5  Regarding minority rights, 
the COE has specifically said that countries must adhere to Recommendation 1201 
(Andrescu 1995:46-49), whereas it has made no such proclamation vis-à-vis the Charter on 
                                                 
 
5 For example, though it had not yet achieved member status, the COE suspended Belarus’ “special guest” 
privileges in 1997 (www.coe.int). 
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Minority Languages. The COE will likely not sanction Romania for its failure to ratify the 
Charter.  
Recently, the COE has become a de facto arbitrator between host-states and kin-states 
when disagreements arise surrounding laws agreed to in one country that affect the citizens 
or ethnic brethren of the other country. A good example of this mediating role is the case of 
the “Hungarian Status Law” of 2001—a law agreed to by a conservative Hungarian 
government that granted various social and economic privileges to Romanian citizens of 
Hungarian ethnicity. The Romanian government objected to the COE. After it was clear that 
European observers objected to the law, a newly elected Hungarian government rewrote the 
law so that it would conform to European norms.6 
 
 
The EU:  
As Melanie Ram points out (2001b: 3), the EU provides legal guarantees of minority 
rights in six distinct places within key EU legislation. The Maastricht Treaty, the 
Copenhagen Criteria, “Europe Agreements” with various countries, the EU Pact on Stability 
in Europe, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and lastly the EU guarantees 
the rights of minorities via the relevant laws that the COE has agreed to (Ram 3). Since all of 
the new EU member states, plus Bulgaria and Romania, were members of the COE prior to 
their joining the EU, a COE requirement integrated into national law is as important as an EU 
                                                 
 
6 Since the “Status Law” is a Hungarian law and the focus of my paper is Romania, I am not going to get into 
too much detail on the Status Law besides my outline of the COE’s role in mediating the dispute. For more 
information, see Deets (2002 and 2006), Chiva (2006), and the full text of the law, Act LXII of 2001 on 
Hungarians Living in Neighboring States, and the COE report on the law of 19 October 2001. 
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directive in the sense that it is evidence of a European organization having a tangible 
influence on a country’s domestic policies.  
Since 1998, the European Union has also employed the European Monitoring Centre 
on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) to help monitor instances of racism, discrimination, 
xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. Therefore, it is also responsible for examining the minority 
rights situation in the countries under its remit when the situation involves discrimination 
against a particular minority. Additionally, the EU considers the reports of the COE and 
OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities in assessing the progress of aspiring 
member states in the realm of minority rights.  
The EU is different from the other two observatory bodies previously mentioned 
because while a particular country is in the process of becoming an EU member it must prove 
that it has complied, or is in moving toward compliance, with the acquis communautaire and 
all other EU rules. If a country is failing to meet requirements, then the European Council has 
the right not to admit the country into the Union.  
This conditionality means now that the European Union has a stronger enforcement 
mechanism for enforcing its minority rights requirements than the OSCE or the COE do 
insofar as failure to abide by the norms that the EU holds as inviolable would clearly mean a 
delayed entry into the EU for Romania. With Romania already being a member of the OSCE 
and the COE, its expulsion from those bodies is, though theoretically possible, highly 
unlikely. On the other hand, Romania is not officially a member of the EU, though it will 
become one on January 1, 2007, and thus must be on its proverbial best behavior. 
As I will explain in detail later in the essay, one theoretical framework for 
understanding EU impact on politics in Eastern Europe, and Romania, is Milada 
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Vachudova’s “passive” and “active leverage” theory. Through its series of steps leading to 
enlargement and the conditions that must be met before a country can become an EU 
member, the EU has established itself as having strong enforcement mechanisms regarding 
minority rights. 
 11
 
 
 
 
 
Historical overview:  
 
Approximately 11% of the Romanian population identifies themselves as a member 
of a minority group. Of this minority population, the Hungarian minority is the largest at 
about 7% of the total population (2002 Census, cited in CIA World Fact Book 2006). Most of 
the Hungarian population in Romania lives in Transylvania, a section of Romania that 
encompasses the valley that separates the Western and Southern Carpathian mountains. The 
contemporary tension in the region is largely an outgrowth of the often-contested hegemony 
in the region. As Mihailescu notes, Transylvanian history shows that whichever ethnic group 
effectively controlled the region, whether it be Romanians or Hungarians, oppressed the 
opposite group (2005:29).    
In 1920, following the signing of the post-World War I Treaty of Trianon, 
Transylvania officially became a part of Romania. This redrawing of the map effectively 
meant that many people who were ethnically Hungarian and who had previously lived in 
Hungary now lived under the tutelage of their putative enemy (Niermann Stiftung 2000).  
Though in this period, it is clear that the ingredients for ethnic conflict existed, in the 
1920s, Romania did in fact sign treaties guaranteeing protection to the Hungarian minority. 
However such treaties were not enforced and the central government in Bucharest pushed 
through legislation, such as a new constitution, land reform laws, and a reform of the central 
administration that effectively worked to homogenize the country ethnically (Fischer-Galati 
1994:135).  
As in other European countries, the 1930s bred about a nationalist/fascist movement 
in Romania.  The nationalist/fascist groups in Romania had varying names such as the 
“Legion of the Archangel of Michael” or the “Iron Guard.”7  Such groups were often 
merciless in their persecution of different ethnicities, religions, and lifestyles in 1930s 
Romania. Jews, ethnic Hungarians, Roma, and homosexuals were all harshly victimized by 
the Iron Guard.  
Although it had initially sided with the Nazis, in 1944, Romania changed sides and 
joined the Soviets in fighting against the Nazis in the final year of World War II. The result 
of the War returned Transylvania to the now socialist-inspired Romanian state (the infamous 
Molotov- Ribbentrop non-aggression pact in 1939 had transferred sovereignty over parts of 
Transylvania to Hungary). Once again, the Romanian government attempted, on paper at 
least, to secure rights of language use in courts and in public administration to the Hungarian 
population. However, its “Nationality Law” of 1945 was hardly enforced (Office for 
Hungarians Abroad 2005).8 
This brief historical overview helps us see the traditions and customs of the region in 
the area of ethnic tolerance. As we can see, heading right into and out of the Second World 
War, there was hardly any tradition of Hungarians and Romanians living together in any type 
of lasting peace. The reality of this constant tension through centuries of 
                                                 
 
7For a thorough description of the effect of the “Iron Guard” movement on Romania’s Jews see Simon 2000. 
For more detail on the beliefs of the “Iron Guard” or “Legion of the Archangel of Michael,” see (Rogger 1965 
and Williamson 2000)  
 
8 For a further discussion of nationality and minority laws under a Soviet inspired legal system, see Deets (2002 
and 2006), and Fischer-Galati (1994). The Office for Hungarians Abroad was a government agency that existed 
from 1992-2006, whose mission was to support and coordinate activities of Hungarians living abroad. Since 30 
June 2006, the office has now become a part of the Prime Minister’s office and its staff has been cut by 75%. 
Former heads of the office commented that the PM’s office was probably a better place to deal with sensitive 
minority related issues than a separate government office. Whether this decision was taken under outside 
pressure is an interesting question but not within the scope of this essay (www.fuen-press.info).  
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Romanian/Hungarian history reveals the impressiveness of the two nations’ ability to live 
peacefully with each other now in recent years following the fall of Communism, and adds 
credence to the notion that a third party (i.e. European bodies) was necessary to bring about 
this peace. 
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Ceausescu Period:  
 
Regarding minority policy, most of the Ceausescu years (1965-1989) were marked 
by what Stephen Deets describes as a trend throughout much of the eastern European world 
by the late 1960s. As Deets puts it, then „there was a growing need to bolster legitimacy in 
all the East European states as the economic system crumbled and disillusionment with the 
political system increased, and nationalism was a popular option“ (Deets 2006:426). This 
reversion to nationalism generally manifested itself in assimilation campaigns and in 
Romania, in the reduction in the possibilities for studying in Hungarian (Ibid. 427)—and in 
the elimination of the Hungarian Autonomous Region.9  
The relationship between Romania and Hungary was positive in the final days of 
Ceausescu’s reign and in the first weeks following his execution. The movement that brought 
down Ceausescu began in the border town of Timisioara when a Hungarian pastor was 
sanctioned by the central government in Bucharest for giving sermons that criticized the 
Ceausescu regime (Gallagher 1995:73). Five thousand people took the personal and political 
risk to protest the decision in front of offices of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) 
headquarters in Timisioara.  
                                                 
 
9 The HAR, or Magyar Autonomous Region, as it is sometimes known, was a region of limited Hungarian self-
rule in Communist Romania that existed from 1952-1968 with its administrative capital in Targu Mures 
(Fischer-Galati 136). Ceausescu dissolved it early in his reign in order to assign his close associates, many of 
whom happened to be ethnic Romanians, to top positions within the Romanian Communist Party (Gilberg 
1990:174). 
By the end of that week, groups of all nationalities across Romania had taken to the 
streets demanding the end of authoritarian rule in Bucharest. Though over 1,000 people died 
in the course of the violence leading to Ceausescu’s execution the cooperation between 
ethnic groups to help bring about Ceausescu’s demise made it seem as if the Romania of the 
future would be one in which ethnicity would be less of an important marker than it had been 
in nearly all previous periods in Romanian history.  
There was reason for hope in this period for multiple reasons: First, in the initial 
chaotic days following Ceausescu’s death, many Hungarians (whose country had only had a 
non-Communist government for a period of months) crossed the border into Romania to 
offer humanitarian supplies to their neighboring country. Second, Hungary was the first 
country to recognize Ion Iliescu’s National Salvation Front (NSF)10 government as the 
legitimate government in Romania. Third, Iliescu’s initial proclamations as head of state 
were of a liberal and inclusive tone. In direct relation to minority rights, in early January of 
1990, Iliescu made a “solemn declaration,” “to guarantee individual and collective rights and 
liberties of all the national minorities [in Romania]” (Ibid. 73-77).  
However, any hope that the multi-ethnic effort that led to Ceausescu’s demise would 
result in a tolerant and multi-ethnic Romania soon dissipated. By the end of January, Iliescu 
was condemning “separatist trends” in Transylvania and seemed to have lost his spirit for 
ethnic reconciliation that had marked his speech only one month earlier (Ibid. 83).  
Why was there such a rapid change in the mood surrounding minority rights? One 
reason was the general state of chaos and confusion in the country in late 1989 and early 
                                                 
 
10The NSF, a party somewhat comprised of second-level officials in the Ceausescu regime, quickly became the 
dominant political party in Romania in the initial post-Ceausescu days.    
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1990. As Gallagher notes, many early decisions were made by a small group of people in a 
“hurried and confused atmosphere” (Ibid. 77). Second, given the rapidity of change in 
Romania then, the interim ruling NSF was becoming inhabited by nationalistic forces, who 
did not want a pluralistic and liberal Romania. Third, the Hungarian minority’s political 
representation, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania of (UDMR)11 formed on 
Christmas Day in 1989, literally hours after Ceausescu’s death had according to Gallagher 
approached its new political rights too impatiently especially regarding the question of 
regional autonomy (Ibid. 86). Though such impatience may have been politically unwise, it 
was historically understandable and helps explain the intensity of the Romanian/Hungarian 
ethnic conflict in late 1989 and early 1990.  
The Hungarian minority was aided in its quest for autonomy by the newly, and freely, 
elected Prime Minister of Hungary Josef Antall. Antall infamously proclaimed in 1990 that 
he wanted to be the “Prime Minister in spirit” to the 15 million ethnic Hungarians living 
throughout the world, not only the 10 million living within the bounds of Hungary 
(Vachudova 147). 
This expression was especially threatening to countries that share a border with 
Hungary, and who have significant populations of ethnic Hungarian minorities.12 In the early 
days of independence, there was no agreement between the Hungarian leadership and 
European organizations regarding the correct course of action to resolve the 
Hungarian/Romanian ethnic dispute. While Antall was forcefully advocating for his ethnic 
                                                 
 
11 UDMR is the acronym in Romanian. 
 
12 In addition to Romania, Hungary’s relations with Slovakia were particularly tense in the early 1990s. For 
more on this relationship, see Vachudova (2005) and Tesser (2003). 
 17
kin, European and Western actors feared that such fiery rhetoric would destabilize the region 
and result in a Balkan-like war (Ibid. 148).  
There were however two signs of hope for a better relationship between the minority 
and majority population in the early years of post-Communist Romania. The first were the 
expressions from leading Romanian political figures that the country should become 
democratic. Second, by this time international organizations were beginning to realize that 
ethnic conflicts in post-Communist Eastern Europe had the potential to ignite the region into 
serious conflict (as was already happening in the Balkans). The neutral and pacific 
involvement of European actors was a factor that had never previously been a strong force in 
Romanian/Hungarian relations; therefore, one could hope that domestic and international 
actors could work together and achieve what domestic actors alone never could: a modicum 
of peace between the Romanian and Hungarian populations of Romania.  
Therefore we see in the early 1990s a number of agreements coming from European 
bodies attempting to set a groundwork of European norms that eastern European countries 
could follow in order to bring about ethnic peace: The Council of Europe agreed to the 
„Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities“ in 1993. At nearly the 
same time, the COE agreed to Recommendation 1201.13 Also in 1993, the EU agreed to the 
“Copenhagen Criteria” that outlined the requirements for membership into the EU. 
“Protection of minorities” is a specific element of the political section of the Copenhagen 
Criteria. Romania became a member of the COE in 1993.  
Romania’s decision to join or seek membership in European organizations obligated 
the country to follow these organizations’ rules. Among others, one duty of both 
                                                 
 
13 See pg. 13. I will also discuss Recommendation 1201 in more detail in my chapter “Vachudova’s Argument.” 
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organizations was making sure that political and legal structures were in place to ensure the 
safety of national minorities in Romania. 
Gallagher argues (2001:389) that the Council of Europe, through its acceptance of 
both Russia and Croatia as members may have damaged its reputation as a protector of 
human rights, since at the time of their entry the human rights records of those countries were 
dubious. One might take Gallagher’s argument to suggest that the COE is a weak body when 
it comes to enforcing European norms on minority rights. However, the COE has the 
authority to sanction countries within its purview that flagrantly fail to abide by COE norms. 
Whether the COE would take such action against a country that is already a member, and not 
in the membership process, is a slightly different question, but the instruments exist for the 
COE to take action against recalcitrant states (www.coe.int).  
Regardless of the COE’s enforcement mechanism, its criteria for membership are 
much less onerous than the EU’s. For example, it took Romania nearly four years  to join the 
COE following the fall of Ceausescu. Romania’s imminent accession to the EU on January 1, 
2007 means that it will be twelve years from its initial membership application to achieving 
full membership. This period of time between what is essentially the first step to membership 
and membership itself allows there to be ample time for the European Union to help shape 
the political and economic institutions of a country to ensure that it not only meets a bare 
minimum of democratic requirements, but also can reasonably hope to adopt the Euro as its 
currency, join the “Schengen” passport-free travel area and integrate the bulky acquis 
communautaire into its domestic law.  
How the EU entices countries to converge various policies toward an EU norm is 
clearly a large and multi-faceted question. Here I will outline a theory of European 
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integration in Eastern Europe that I find compelling and then show how that theory applies to 
the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania. While I hope to show that Milada 
Vachudova’s theory provides a parsimonious explanation for the development of minority 
rights in Romania, I do not mean to suggest that it is the only plausible theory, nor does my 
emphasis on European actors preclude the importance of the role that domestic actors have 
played, and continue to play, in improving the condition of the Hungarian minority in 
Romania.  
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Vachudova’s Argument:  
 
In her book, Europe Undivided (2005), Milada Vachudova presents the ways in 
which the European Union entices states to embark on liberal reform. Vachudova calls the 
first type of enticement “passive leverage.” She chooses this description because in this case 
the EU is not actively pushing a particular country to reform. Rather reformers within the 
country in question use the “benefits of membership” as a motivation to reform (Vachudova 
2005:4). This was the only type of leverage that the EU could propagate from 1989-1994. 
“Passive leverage” also was not capable of transforming a country from having an illiberal 
and rent-seeking government to one that is liberal and espousing democratic principles. The 
argument lists three countries as having moved quickly, on their own, toward liberal 
principles, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, while three others, Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Slovakia lagged behind.  
As Vachudova states, “The EU’s passive leverage merely reinforced liberal strategies 
of reform in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while failing to avert, end, or 
significantly diminish rent-seeking strategies for winning and exercising power in Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Slovakia” (Ibid.).  
“Active leverage” goes beyond “passive leverage” in that it combines the benefits of 
EU membership with a clear outlining of the conditions that countries must fulfill in order to 
achieve EU membership (i.e. “conditionality). Vachudova underscores the three elements to 
EU conditionality that strengthen the EU in the negotiating process and make it a credible 
negotiating partner: “asymmetric interdependence,“ “enforcement,” and “meritocracy.” 
Following this deeper theoretical explanation of “active leverage”, I will show how this type 
of leverage was important in the development of minority rights within Romania. 
“Asymmetric interdependence” means that the applicant state and the European 
Union are not equal players in the negotiations. Rather, the applicant state needs membership 
into the Union more than the EU desires more members. This clearly tilted the balance of 
power in the negotiations and allowed the EU to pressure countries that had verbally 
expressed interest in joining the EU, but for sundry political reasons were not taking the 
necessary steps to become qualified for EU membership. “This imbalance allowed the EU to 
make believable threats of exclusion, turning up the heat on illiberal states by threatening to 
keep them out of the pre-accession process entirely“ (Ibid. 109).  
Vachudova’s concept of “asymmetric interdependence” is particularly intriguing 
regarding questions of minority rights because it shows how the EU could circumvent 
apparent inconsistencies within its minority policy when negotiating with applicant states. It 
could effectively insist that eastern European countries adapt “European standards” on 
minority rights, when in fact, there was no agreement among western European countries as 
to what constituted “European standards” (Ibid. 145-146). That the EU could push for 
something whose normative grounding was fluid reflects the influence that the EU had with 
candidate states in this area. 
“Enforcement” means that the EU maintains the right to examine the internal affairs 
of a state preparing to join it. (Ibid. 110-111). It is within this area of „active leverage“ where 
we can clearly view the affect that the EU can have on the domestic politics of candidate 
states, and specifically, how it influenced the minority policies of Romania. Vachudova lists 
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seven steps in the process to accession. It is within the middle four stages where the scrutiny 
from the European level onto domestic actions is intensified and thus demonstrating the EU’s 
capacity for genuine enforcement.  
The first step is the signing of trade agreements and the commensurate receipt of 
PHARE14 aid. Following the signing of the trade agreement comes the signing of the 
association agreement. Vachudova describes the Europe agreements as essentially trade 
agreements that “establish a political relationship as well” (Ibid. 127). The EU then 
scrutinizes that the candidate countries have met the requirements of the Europe agreements 
before it decides that the country is prepared to open further negotiations. For the 
negotiations to be completed, the EU and the candidate state must “close” each of the thirty-
one chapters of the acquis communautaire, a process that can take years. Once the candidate 
country closes the chapters, then it signs an accession treaty with the EU, which national 
parliaments and the European parliament then must ratify (Ibid.).  
The outlining of this process is important because it gives groundwork to 
understanding the precautions that the EU took against Romania because of concerns about 
ethnic conflict between Hungarians and Romanians.  
Vachudova notes that the “first tool of the EU’s active leverage” was public criticism 
of candidate states who were failing to meet their obligations under the Copenhagen Criteria 
(Ibid. 127). However even before the expression of criticism, the EU insisted on putting 
language into the Europe Agreement with Romania that made the agreement conditional on 
„respect for human and minority rights” (Ibid). This example strengthens the point that the 
                                                 
 
14 PHARE stands for “Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy,” but following 
its initial use with those two countries the EU has extended its availability to all of the ten new member states, 
plus many former Yugoslav countries and Albania (Grabbe 2001).   
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EU was paying close attention to the minority rights issue, even before it had developed the 
elaborate system of conditionality that is the underpinning for Vachudova’s “active leverage” 
theory. Lastly, Vachudova notes the concept of “Meritocracy.” Meritocracy is important 
because it offers credibility to the accession process. If a country has fulfilled all of the 
requirements for membership, then the EU is obligated to admit that country into the Union.  
This section of the essay will examine whether or not the EU practiced „active 
leverage“ in the way Vachudova describes the concept, and if so, how it was practiced.   
The work of Melanie Ram (2001a) is particularly helpful in examining the interaction 
between Romania and the EU within the context of Vachudova’s theoretical framework. She 
shows that conformity to EU norms is both a top-down and bottom-up process and helps us 
avoid reading Vachudova to mean that “late arriving” EU candidate states, such as Romania, 
cannot react on their own toward the “benefits of membership.”  
A main difference between Romania and a country like the Czech Republic or 
Poland, a country whose efforts toward reform were initially much stronger than Romania's 
is that while the Czech Republic and Poland reacted to the “benefits of membership” in the 
early 1990s, before the EU had even expressed a willingness to take on new members, 
Romania’s full effort toward EU accession did not take off until after the EU had issued the 
Copenhagen Criteria and had set up a clear process toward membership.  
Nevertheless, as Ram shows, Romania’s dedication to the EU, and to European 
institutions, has, since the mid-1990s been unceasing. This connection to European 
institutions is so strong that former Romanian Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase once uttered 
that joining the EU is, “to such an extent crucial to Romania that we could consider it to be 
an internal factor of our development” (Ibid. 2). Although Ram goes into considerable detail 
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describing the impact of European Union norms and expectations on Romania’s role as a 
regional actor, I will focus instead on the role of the EU in facilitating the 1996 friendship 
treaty between Romania and Hungary.  
Given the contested history between Romania and Hungary, and the low point that 
they had arrived at both before the fall of Ceausescu and in the tense period following 
Iliescu’s first election to the Presidency in 1990, it is impressive that the countries could 
come to an agreement on a treaty of friendship in just a few years. There is no doubt that a 
shared desire to join the EU helped motivate both countries toward finding a peaceful 
resolution to their long-standing border disputes. 
Romania and Hungary initiated negotiations for a friendship treaty in 1991, but for 
the first few years of each country’s independence, the talks went nowhere. Ram notes that a 
European Commission magazine, European Dialogue, expressed serious doubt that the 
bilateral conflict could be resolved, “most analysts agree Hungary’s attempts at reconciliation 
are doomed to fail…nationalists have a strong influence in the [Romanian] government and 
are likely to stymie attempts to improve relations with Hungary …despite several gestures by 
Hungary, bilateral treaties seem to be as far away as ever” (Ibid. 5). Yet here the real effect 
of “active leverage” could not be clearer. Both countries understood that in order to move 
forward in the process to join the European Union, and NATO, they needed to prove a stable 
bilateral relation.15  
                                                 
 
15 Though it is beyond the scope of this essay, it is important to note that Romania also had to reach a friendship 
treaty with the Ukraine to move forward in the membership queue for both the EU and NATO. This treaty was 
perhaps more controversial than the friendship treaty with Hungary because it required that Romania accept the 
loss of its historical territory along the border with Ukraine that was given to the Soviet Union as a condition of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939 (Ram a 7 ). 
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Examining the concerns of Romania and Hungary regarding the friendship treaty 
reveals a deeper element of Vachudova’s “asymmetric interdependence” discussion within 
active leverage theory. “Asymmetric interdependence” does not imply that all relations 
between the EU and its aspiring member states are purely bilateral. The EU does not 
necessarily make demands on a particular country that are detached from a broader regional 
context. To better understand this “triadic”16 situation let us imagine that the EU was not 
involved in the bilateral relation between Romania and Hungary, or that there was no, or 
minimal, conditionality required for both countries to join the EU.  
Then, given the necessary sacrifices on both the Hungarian and Romanian sides to 
quell nationalism enough to satisfy the membership requirements of the EU and NATO, it is 
highly unlikely that they could have resolved their long-standing dispute. However, as the 
negotiations actually played out, both Hungary and Romania recognized that they needed a 
resolution in order to move forward in both the EU and NATO application process and 
therefore they did not stop negotiating until they had reached an agreement.  
The main points of contention surrounded Romania’s demand that there be a clause in 
the treaty outlining border inviolability (Ibid. 5). This insistence was clearly an attempt to put 
legal shackles on separatist elements within the UDMR that had advocated territorial 
autonomy in parts of Transylvania. Hungary would not sign any treaty that did not contain 
the COE Recommendation 1201. According to Gabriel Andrescu of the Romania Helsinki 
Committee (1995), the points of contention within Recommendation 1201 were Arts. 7 and 
                                                 
 
16 Chiva (2006) cites Rogers Brubaker as using the term “triadic” in the context of minority rights. His three 
actors are the “nationalizing state”, “national minority”, and the “external national homeland.” Here I mean 
simply Romania, Hungary, and the European Union. 
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11.17 Art. 7 called for the right to conduct activities of public administration in the native 
language (of particular importance to the Hungarian population). At the point of friendship 
treaty negotiations, Romanian law did not guarantee this right even though, in addition to the 
districts in Transylvania with significant Hungarian minorities, there are two counties in 
Romania (Harghita and Covasna) with majority Hungarian populations.18  
There was also concern in Romania surrounding Art. 11 that some Romanian political 
actors took to imply that Rec. 1201 guaranteed to Hungarians living in Romania “autonomy 
rights.”19 Andrescu notes that this was not the intention of Art. 11 (1995). The parties were 
able to resolve this misunderstanding through a “join interpretation” of Rec. 1201 that was 
included as part of the friendship treaty. Rec. 1201 was included into the treaty, but both 
parties agreed that 1201 did not grant “collective rights” to the Hungarian people and the 
treaty solidified that Romania and Hungary “have no territorial claims on each other and that 
they shall not raise any such claims in the future” (Ram a 5).  
As we can see, the insistence of European organizations resulted in dialogue and a 
certain element of compromise on both sides in order to secure a commitment to ethnic peace 
                                                 
 
17 As a brief of example of Romania’s conformity with Rec. 1201 prior to treaty negotiations, Art. 6 requires 
that ethnic political parties be allowed. Given the UDMR was literally present at the creation of democratic 
Romania, we can see that Romania had at least been in conformity with this European norm from the beginning.  
 
18 Though not directly related to my thesis, an interesting article by Donna Cajvaneanu (2004) notes that suicide 
rates among ethnic Hungarians in these counties are higher than average. Also, the Hungarians that live in 
Covasna and Harghita counties are called “Szeklers.” According to the European Center for Minority Issues, 
(www.ecmi.de), though there are differences between Szeklers and other Hungarians, they may still be referred 
to as “Hungarians.” 
19 The text of Art. 11 is as follows: In the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a 
national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to 
have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the 
domestic legislation of the state (Recommendation 1201 (1993), on an additional protocol on the rights of 
national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights). 
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and to allow the two countries to move forward in the membership process for the EU and 
NATO. As I will discuss in the next section, it was Romania’s initial entry into the COE that 
gave it the legal instruments to facilitate meeting the conditions of the EU and NATO. 
Furthermore, Melanie Ram (2001b) describes other areas of Romanian domestic law 
within the sphere of minority rights that have been, and are still in the process of being 
significantly affected by European actors. Ram’s argument shows that Romanian political 
actors were reacting to the necessities of membership in a European body before Vachudova 
claims that the EU began implementing “active leverage” (in 1995).  
However, we should not take this difference in time as a refutation of Vachudova’s 
theory nor its applicability in the case of Romania. Rather if we look at European integration 
as a lengthy process in which membership in the COE is a prerequisite to membership in the 
EU, then the COE becomes a part of the European integration process not only as an active 
organization, but also as a potential springboard into the EU.  
Initially, the COE aided Romania in drafting a new constitution following the fall of 
Ceausescu. The COE declared this document to be both “modern” and “democratic” (Ibid. 
6). A major element of Romania’s constitution that pleased European observers is Romania’s 
incorporating of European and international treaties into its own constitution (Ibid. 7). This 
change meant that since the mid-1990s Romania treats the Framework Convention, 
Resolution 1201, and all other international treaties that discuss minority rights with the same 
weight as the constitution.  
Romania solidified its connection to European standards when it joined the COE in 
1993. Joining the COE was not an easy process for Romania. When Romania applied to join 
the COE, the organization was concerned about Romania’s human and minority rights 
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record. This concern was so profound that Ram quotes a Romanian journal as saying that 
Romania was beginning “lower than the Soviet Union” in regards to minority rights (Ibid. 
8).20 Membership to the COE manifested tangible results in Romanian law. Within the period 
of 1994-1995, Romania signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Ibid. 9).21  
Romania made significant changes to its political system to show international 
organizations that it was fully able to break with the repressive past of the Ceausescu regime 
and establish fair and democratic institutions. In 1993, prior even to joining COE, Romania 
changed its electoral law to reserve fifteen seats in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house 
of the Romanian parliament) for minority candidates. Also in 1993, the country inaugurated 
the Council for National Minorities (Ibid. 10-11).  
More interestingly, Ram quotes political leaders who admit that the inclusion of the 
Hungarian Party, UDMR, in the coalition, and the naming of two Hungarian ministers to the 
cabinet, that unseated the post-Communist party in 1996 was taken as a way to make 
Romania look tolerant and open.22 As Michael Shafir (1997) writes, there were great 
expectations within the new government that following an election of a liberal and western-
                                                 
20 In her earlier essay (a 17), Ram notes that in 1989 Samuel Huntington rated Romania and Sudan as “the two 
countries with the worst chances for democratic consolidation” (emphasis in original). 
 
21 It still has not ratified this document. 
 
22  In the 1996 election, Romania unseated the post-Communist PDSR for the more liberal and western oriented 
coalition of CDR, USD, and, most surprisingly, the UDMR. The introduction of UDMR into government 
brought about one major development for minority rights immediately. As part of the coalition agreement, the 
Prime Minister Ciorbea agreed to name two Hungarian ministers to the cabinet and also established a 
Department for National Minorities and named an ethnic Hungarian, and member of UDMR, to head the 
department. Although the inclusion of UDMR into the coalition is clearly an act of domestic politics, and 
therefore one could assess any legislative change coming out of the coalition as being purely domestic in 
influence, the reality is that the change in coalition and law indirectly involved European actors.  
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oriented coalition that Romania could soon easily join NATO and the European Union. It is 
therefore probable that the appointment of two Hungarian ministers to the cabinet and the 
establishing of the Department for Minorities had some “cosmetic” motivations behind them. 
Furthermore, it was a shared desire to see Romania eventually qualify for EU 
membership that helped keep the coalition between the Christian Democrats and UDMR 
together, despite occasional intense differences between the parties (Ram b 12).23  
PHARE assistance through the EU helped fund NGOs in Romania, such as the 
Helsinki Committee, that could monitor and report on the conditions for ethnic minorities in 
Romania. As Ram notes, NGOs generally are familiar with minority groups, the history of 
various conflicts between minorities, and also about international commitments that their 
host governments have signed, obligating them to protect their minorities. The PHARE 
program therefore has allowed the EU to fund de facto supervisory bodies (Ibid. 13).  
Ram further emphasizes the role that the EU and other European bodies played in the 
development of minority rights in Romania in her focus on the Romanian “Education Law” 
of 1995. Actors on both sides of the question debated the law not only on its merits but also 
on the question of whether it conformed to European norms that Romania was committed to 
following (Ibid. 21).  
The Romanian government passed the law one month after it applied to join the EU 
(in 1995). The government clearly knew that members of the Hungarian minority and its 
sympathizers would soon take issue to the law and then try to claim that prevailing European 
norms vindicated their position. In order to combat this potential conflict, the Romanian 
                                                 
23 For an insightful analysis of the UDMR party within the Romanian political system, see Johnson (2002). He 
notes one additional reason that UDMR can remain in coalition with mainstream Romanian parties even when 
in principle the two parties do not agree on questions of regional autonomy: a shared desire to marginalize 
nationalist extremists out of the Romanian political scene (Ibid. 19). 
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government printed information on the law, in English, that claimed that the law was, “One 
of the most Democratic in Europe” (Ibid.) and that it clearly followed the European norm by 
allowing students to receive education in their native language (Ibid. 22). Furthermore, the 
Romanian government then went on to blame Hungarian forces at the European level for 
deliberately misrepresenting the law to make it seem more oppressive to Hungarian interests 
than it really was (Ibid. 21).  
UDMR also used international fora to bolster its case that the law did not meet 
European norms and sent Hungarian students to Strasbourg to protest the law in the European 
capital (Ibid. 22).  
The debate swirling around the Education Law continued after the 1996 election 
when the coalition of UDMR and the Christian Democrats came to power. This coalition was 
fully committed to break Romania away from its Communist legacy, improve the condition 
of the Hungarian minority, and make Romania a stronger candidate for EU accession.  
Therefore the coalition took action on the Education Law and expanded it in ways 
that opposition parties (i.e. the previous government) found unimaginable. The newly drafted 
version of the law allowed students to receive education in Hungarian from kindergarten 
through university, and even suggested the possibility of establishing a Hungarian university.  
The Romanian government made these changes just as the EU was about to publish 
an Opinion on Romania’s progress toward EU accession in 1997 (Ibid. 21). Since at the time 
of the vote, there were still enough votes in the parliament to block the bill from passing, the 
government decided to take the provisions of the law and turn it into an “Emergency 
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Ordinance”, thus not requiring the consent of the parliament.24 Romania then boasted about 
this law in a report to the EU in that same year (Ibid. 22). 
                                                 
 
24 For a discussion as to whether European integration in Central and Eastern European states (CEE) leads to a 
democratic deficit at the national level, see Grabbe (2001). The Education law was eventually modified then 
reestablished in 1999, with the same principles as the original law: students may study in their native language 
at all levels and the law opens the possibility for a Hungarian university in Romania (Ram b 24). 
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Framework Convention: 
 
As noted earlier, European states have not yet fully agreed on a clear definition of a 
“national minority."25 However, European bodies did agree to a normative framework 
regarding eastern applicant states, and one of the documents that has emerged over the last 
decade as being a fundamental document vis-à-vis minority rights is the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention on National Minorities. As Vachudova notes, “the [European] 
Commission devotes particular attention to the implementation of the various principles laid 
down in the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities” (Vachudova 122), whose importance vis-à-vis the Hungarian minority in 
Romania we will examine now.  
The Framework Convention is an important document for Romania in that its full 
implementation would not only mean a full convergence with European norms, but also, and 
perhaps more importantly for the nation itself, a full break with Ceausescu’s legacy. Romania 
ratified the Framework Convention in 1997. The important articles in the Framework 
Convention for Romania and its effort to break its legacy of conflict with the Hungarian 
minority are 3, 10, and 12-14 (www.coe.int)26.  
                                                 
 
25 See Deets (2002 and 2006) for a further explication on debates within Europe on minority rights theory.  
 
26 Though it is hopefully clear, all subsequent “Art.” references are from the Framework Convention, unless 
otherwise indicated.  
Article 3 states the basic principle that every resident of a country has the right to 
decide whether or not he belongs to a minority and whether or not he identifies with the 
minority.27 The government may not penalize a resident because of his decision regarding 
minority identification. This clause represents a clear break from the Ceausescu period. 
Under Ceausescu’s rule, Romania engaged in a “Romanization” campaign that attempted to 
assert both the Romanian language and a Romanian identity as inflexible norms within the 
country. This effort manifested itself not only in an effort to make it harder to study in 
Hungarian at all educational levels, but also in an insistence that all administrative activities 
be carried out in Romanian, and in a movement to make all administrators and policemen be 
ethnic Romanians, even in parts of the country that had large Hungarian populations 
(Fischer-Galati 1994:135 and Niermann Stiftung 2000). This open prejudice against the 
Hungarian population was at such an intense point in the late 1980s that relations between 
the two countries, who were putative allies within the Eastern bloc, were at a nadir (Gilberg 
1990:175-177).  
Article 10 provides a positive right to the use of native languages in courtrooms and 
in other administrative bodies. This right extends to a requirement that government 
authorities issue written responses in the petitioner’s native language (www.coe.int).  Articles 
12-14 cover issues pertaining to education. Art. 12 secures the principle that all citizens have 
equal access to education, irrespective of their belonging to a national minority. This article 
                                                 
 
27 This is a basic European norm that is not only discussed regarding the Romania/Hungary situation, but also in 
discussions of minority populations in the Baltic states (Decker 2005), whose relations with their Russian 
minorities is also a source of controversy. 
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is significant in the case of Babes-Bolyai University, a historic trilingual university in the 
Transylvanian town of Cluj that we will examine shortly.28 
Article 13 outlines the right to build a school in which students can take instruction 
in their native language. Article 14 goes further and cements the right for students to attend 
lessons in their native language (Ibid.). 
Now that we see the obligations that Romania has taken up as a condition of joining 
European bodies, let us look at what the Romanian government has done to put these 
requirements into action. This examination is especially important given Romania’s poor 
history of implementing laws having to do with minority rights. 
In 1999, the Romanian parliament passed a new education law that allows students 
to study from kindergarten to university in Hungarian. This law brings Romanian education 
law into full compliance with Article 14 of the Framework Convention. Furthermore, 
Romanian changed its constitution in 2003 to strengthen the right to use the Hungarian 
language in public administration cases and in courtrooms.  
These laws further continue Romania’s efforts to harmonize its laws with European 
norms. Perhaps it is a testament to this convergence that the Government Office for 
Hungarian Minorities Abroad praised the aforementioned two Romanian laws as being a 
“breakthrough in minority right protection” (Hungarian Govt. Office 2005). 
A tangible example of this European involvement in developing language policy, in a 
broader context of minority policy, is at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj, Romania. The 
university’s history is remarkable in its own right. Having been founded by the Jesuits in 
                                                 
 
28 Though not the focus of this essay, Art. 12 is particularly important in the question of the Roma minority, 
whose condition is far worse than the Hungarian minority’s both in Romania and in other parts of Europe 
(primarily Eastern Europe). 
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1581, Protestants took over control of the school in 1603, then by the late 18th Century it was 
under the control of Catholics for a second time (Marga 1997:160). Though it is now without 
a religious affiliation, the language of instruction has shifted with the political forces 
controlling the area. Latin and German were the main languages in the university’s early 
years, however as the political desire for independence between Hungary and Romania 
intensified in the mid-19th Century the language of the university at Cluj became an 
explosive issue.  
In 1872, despite efforts among some elites to make the university multilingual, 
university administrators decided to teach only in Hungarian. By the time after World War I, 
when Romania gained political control of the region, Romania took over the university as a 
state institution and naturally chose Romanian as the language of instruction. When Hungary 
controlled Transylvania, during the first four years of World War II, Hungarian became the 
language of instruction. Finally, following the 1945 reallocation of Transylvania to Romania, 
the Romanian government established a Hungarian university in Cluj called Bolyai and in 
1956 it combined Bolyai with the older university in Cluj to form the current Babes-Bolyai 
University. The combined university offered instruction in both Romanian and Hungarian. 
However, Hungarian language instruction became increasingly limited under Ceausescu’s 
rule.29  
As the current Rector of Babes-Bolyai, and philosophy professor under Ceausescu’s 
reign, Andrei Marga notes, especially after 1971, the RCP under Ceausescu controlled the 
university ideology, not only limiting Hungarian language instruction, but also attempting to 
                                                 
 
29 All information pertaining to Babes-Bolyai, unless otherwise indicated, comes from the university’s website, 
www.ubbcluj.ro.  
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impose Romanian/nationalist variant of Marxism/Leninism onto the general curriculum at 
Babes-Bolyai and other Romanian universities. 
Marga’s essay shows that the European Union has been an active supporter of 
university reform in Romania since the first years following the overthrow of Ceausescu. The 
elements of reform all involve an orientation toward liberal thinking, contact with the West, 
decentralization of hiring and appointment processes, and, of particular interest to us, 
developing strong involvement from both ethnic-Hungarian and ethnic-German students and 
professors.30 Marga describes the involvement of the EU and the Romanian government with 
Babes-Bolyai as “strategic” (Marga 164). He further explains that a country cannot transform 
itself from a socialist, authoritarian, and ideologically rigid system to one that is liberal and 
open without ensuring that its future leaders receive a liberal and open education.  
As BBU is now proud to point out, this reform effort, one that European institutions 
have largely helped to shape, has resulted in Babes Bolyai being a culturally dynamic and 
linguistically diverse center of higher learning. The institution, with 45,000 students 
(comprising both undergraduate and graduate students) offers three different language tracks, 
German, Hungarian, and Romanian. This does not necessarily mean that every course that is 
offered in one language is offered in the others, but the language track system does allow for 
a high level of linguistic diversity. Practically speaking, of the 21 faculties at the university, 
courses within fifteen of them are available in Romanian and Hungarian and in nine of the 
faculties courses are available in Romanian and German (www.ubbcluj.ro). In addition, at 
                                                 
 
30 For further detailed background information and an analysis of current attempts by nationalistic Hungarians 
to establish a separate Hungarian university and opposition to this movement from both the Hungarian and 
Romanian community in Cluj, see Karl-Peter Schwarz, “In Klausenberg reissen alte Gräben auf,” (In 
Klausenberg (Cluj-Napoca), all the graves are ripping open), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 August 2006.   
 37
each level of university administration there are a certain number of seats reserved for a 
representative(s) of each linguistic “line of study.”  
In addition to the European Union, other international institutions have guided and 
evaluated Babes-Bolyai’s language curriculum policy. These groups consist of the OSCE 
HCNM, the European University Association, and the Salzburg Seminar. It is clear that their 
involvement, in addition to the EU—its funding and opening of exchange programs such as 
ERASMUS to Romanian students—is helping to foster and encourage openness, tolerance, 
and diversity at Babes-Bolyai.  
Given the poor state of universities following the overthrow of Ceausescu and the 
general lukewarm attitude toward reform from the first presidential regime of Iliescu (Marga 
164), it is evident that European involvement played a role in the liberalization process of 
Romanian universities. Expressed another way, had European institutions stayed out of 
Romania entirely following the fall of Ceausescu, it is highly unlikely that any efforts toward 
openness, the development of linguistic “lines of study”, or the explicit efforts to include 
minorities into the forming of the curriculum would have occurred. As Marga noted, if this 
failure had manifested itself at the university level, it clearly would not have boded well for 
the future development of minority rights for Hungarians, or any other minority, in regards to 
obtaining legally defined rights or the expansion of opportunities. 
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Comparison case Georgia:  
 
At this point, it should be clear that European actors have played, and are continuing 
to play, a significant role in moving Romania forward in its relations with its Hungarian 
minority. Whether it was the negotiations for the friendship treaty, the Education law, or 
changes to education and administrative laws in the late 1990s or early 2000s, Romania’s 
laws regarding minority rights, are always being formed with an eye to European norms.  
In order, however, to strengthen my case that European actors have played an 
important role in the development of minority rights in Romania, I am going to examine, 
albeit briefly, a second case that presents similar circumstances, but without the strong 
engagement of the European Union. 
The case that I have chosen is the Republic of Georgia. Like Romania, Georgia has a 
significant minority population, though Georgia’s is slightly larger than Romania’s (16% 
versus 11%). Georgia also gained its independence from the Soviet Union at approximately 
the same time that Romania overthrew its Soviet-inspired dictator. One considerable 
difference is population; Romania has a population of approximately 21 million while 
Georgia’s is slightly under 5 million (2002 Census, CIA World Fact Book 2006). 
Georgia earned its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. However Georgia 
had to fight a two-year long civil war in order to secure peace with independence (Kandelaki 
2006). This fact represents one of the major differences between Georgia’s post-Communist 
experience and Romania’s, besides the scope of the involvement of international third 
parties. Although Romania’s initial experience following the fall of Ceausescu was violent at 
times (e.g. the Targu Mures riots and the intervention of “vigilante workers” in Bucharest in 
June of 1990 to break up an opposition protest31), it was never a civil war.  
According to a report of the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), the 
newly independent Georgian nation, under its first post-Soviet president attempted to 
“Georgianize” all citizens in the first years of its independence. FUEN regrets that this 
“Georgianization” largely destroyed the tradition of tolerance that had marked the country for 
years. 
As the FUEN report (1998) indicates, this decision from the new administration to 
impose a homogenous identity onto the population was particularly unfortunate given the 
country’s history as a tolerant land—a place where many different ethnic groups had lived 
together in peace (Ibid.). Georgia’s history is therefore different from Romania’s in that 
ethnic violence has taken place in Transylvania for centuries.  
Given this history, it is equally impressive what Romania and Hungary have been 
able to accomplish in softening minority conflicts between their respective ethnic groups, and 
it is equally depressing to see how tense minority relations in Georgia have remained since 
independence.  
Currently in Georgia there are two autonomous republics: Abkhazia and Ajaria. An 
armed conflict erupted in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early days of Georgian 
independence but stopped in 1992 (World Fact Book 2006). Since then, however, Russian 
troops have been present in those regions and still occupy some military bases within 
                                                 
 
31 Citation is from Gallagher (2001:387). These two events along with evidence of violence and corruption 
during Romania’s first post-Ceausescu election in May of 1990 prompted the US Ambassador to be recalled 
and a freezing of agreements that Romania had already made with the US and EU (Ibid.).  
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Georgian territory. In an example of the political situation being far more unresolved than in 
the case of Romania and Hungary, there are still parts of the Georgian border, both with 
Russia and with Armenia to the east, that are not officially demarcated (Ibid.).  
Although the ethnic Russian population is officially listed as only 1.5% of the 
population, many residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia hold Russian passports. The 
presence of Russian citizens in the region gives the Russian government a pretext for its 
military occupation of parts of Georgia. Recently military tensions and public expressions of 
anger on both the Georgian and Russian side have resulted in concerns in international media 
that the two sides might be on the brink of war.32 
While the Russian citizenry is perhaps the most vocal minority group in Georgia, a 
larger minority group is the Armenian minority, whose members consist of 5.7 % of the 
population. Additionally the 2002 census reports that 7% of the population speaks Armenian 
(Ibid.). Recently this minority has aired grievances that are strikingly similar to those that the 
Hungarian minority expressed to the Romanian government in the first years following 
independence.  
The Armenian community in the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti is asking the central 
government for expanded language rights (Maridirossian 2006). This is a particularly 
important point for the population because many members of the ethnically Armenian 
population in the region do not speak Georgian and the area is economically depressed. The 
                                                 
 
32 Economist, “Fighting Casts a Summer Shadow,” 3 August 2006 and “More Bad Feelings on Russia’s 
Georgian Border,” 23 February 2006. The New York Times also reported in a compilation of Russian news that 
So. Ossetia will be holding a referendum in November on independence from Georgia (James K. Phillips and 
Michael Schwirtz, “3 Students Suspected in Other Moscow Bombings,” New York Times 29 August 2006). On 
regional conflicts in Georgia and the Russian practice of issuing passports to residents of Abkhazia, see also 
C.J. Chivers “Sun and Surf, but also lines in the ‘Russian’ sand,” New York Times, 20 August 2006.  This 
conflict has further intensified in late September and early October of 2006, following Georgia’s arrest of four 
Russians accused of spying on Georgian territory and Russia’s retaliatory deportations of Georgians in Russia 
“illegally” and blocking fiduciary and postal transfers between the two countries.   
 
Armenian language is not only suppressed, but the history of the Armenian people is as well. 
According to Maridirossian, one of the Armenian population’s chief grievances is the 
Georgian government’s ban on teaching Armenian history in Georgian schools.  
The language and cultural situation among the Armenian population in Georgia is 
certainly worse even than that between the Romanian and Hungarian population in Romania 
is today, and probably also was even in the peak of Ceausescu’s discriminatory activities in 
the 1980s. It is not surprising that when a population is being forced to speak a language it 
cannot speak that the political situation would become more intense than a situation where a 
population is being coerced into speaking a language it has the ability to speak, but would 
rather not speak.  
Relations between Armenians and Georgians in Georgia take on a fraught historical 
element that surrounds the “Armenian genocide” of 1915. The Georgian Armenian 
community is insisting that the Georgian government acknowledge the genocide as an 
historical fact, and the current government is refusing to do so. Tensions between the 
Georgian and Armenian community reached a point last March that riots between the two 
communities took place, following the killing of an ethnic Armenian during a brawl (Ibid.).33  
The Georgian case is an appropriate comparison case for the effect of European 
bodies on the development of rights for the Hungarian minority in Romania because both 
Georgia and Romania share a Communist-inspired past and have many minority groups, 
whose total population consist of similar percentages of the population.  
                                                 
 
33 However during the Ceausescu period, his manipulation of history involved the praising of Romanian heroes, 
such as kings Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave, and Vlad Tepes (who was perhaps Braham Stoker’s 
inspiration for Dracula) “whose fame and fortunes were made in the struggle with outside forces” (Gilburg 
1990:175).  
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Some obvious differences are, however, also noticeable and keep the comparison 
from being cetirus paribus. Georgia is much smaller than Romania, having about a fourth of 
Romania’s population. The size is significant when one examines Georgia geographically. It 
borders Russia and as evidenced by Russia’s continued involvement over some of Georgia’s 
regional conflicts Georgia is a small player with a large and imposing northern neighbor.  
The proximity to Russia raises two points. First, it differentiates Georgia from 
Romania—Romania currently borders Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine, in addition obviously 
to Hungary and Bulgaria, giving it some buffer from Russia.34 Second, the impact of Russia 
is limiting Georgia’s ability to consolidate democratic rule on its territory, as evidenced by 
the ongoing regional conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The case of Romania reveals 
that democratization can lead to liberal minority rights through setting up institutions that 
enable minority groups to organize and represent themselves in legislative bodies (e.g. the 
Hungarian party in Romania). A movement toward democratization also often opens up a 
country to outside forces that encourage liberalization and whose efforts can advance the 
cause of minority rights. 
The peaceful overthrowing of President Eduard Shevardnadze in the autumn of 2003 
reveals that the process of democratic consolidation in Georgia is still largely in its 
developmental stages.35 Some recent reports (Berekashvili 2006) indicate that even Georgia’s 
                                                 
 
34 Romania also, even during the Communist period, always maintained a streak of independence in relation to 
the Soviet Union. Strangely enough, in the early years of Ceausescu’s reign, his policies were the sources of this 
independence. For example, in 1968 he expressed solidarity with protesters in Prague  
(Gilburg 1990:173-174) and in the early 1970s Romania was the first Warsaw Pact country to recognize the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Gallagher 2001:386). Gilburg, writing while Ceausescu was still in power, offers 
an insightful commentary as to how Ceausescu’s independence actually promulgated ethnic division. Ceausescu 
often accompanied his praise of the Romanian people with other implicit or explicit condemnations of other 
ethnic groups living within Romania. 
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new president is not as democratic as western media would like one to believe, with there 
being a disturbing number of reports coming out of Georgia of harassment of dissidents by 
Georgia’s security services agency (Ibid.).  
If we can now see that Georgia’s democratic development and minority rights 
development have moved at a much slower pace than Romania’s, the next question must be 
why this is so. What forces allowed Romania to move its democracy forward that were not 
available for Georgia?  
An analysis of European organizational involvement shows that though some 
European groups, notably the OSCE, have been involved in Georgia since the early 1990s, 
their main goal seems to be the building of infrastructure, maintaining border security, and 
supervising cease-fires. Minority rights do not seem to be an explicit concern of European 
actors.  
The OSCE has had a mission in Georgia since December of 1992. Its primary mission 
is to encourage peace in the Georgian/Ossetian conflict and to support UN efforts to stabilize 
the conflict.36 Since 1994, the OSCE mandate has expanded to facilitate a political 
framework for the achievement of a political settlement, establish international conferences 
on the future of the region, monitor peacekeepers, facilitate further cooperation among the 
different parties involved in the conflict, and to establish contact with regional actors and 
maintain a strong presence in the area. The OSCE is also helping in the rebuilding and 
improving of Georgia’s infrastructure (e.g. roads, train lines, hydroelectric plants, gas 
pipelines, and schools). In a further example of cooperation between European bodies, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
35 For more on the motivations for the “Rose Revolution” and the impact of international organizations in 
supporting it, see Kandelaki (2006). 
 
36 All information on Georgia and the OSCE is, unless otherwise indicated, from www.osce.org/georgia.  
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OSCE is helping administer a 2 million Euro grant from the European Commission for the 
improvement of infrastructure.  
The only area of the OSCE’s work in the region in which the HCNM has been 
actively involved is the OSCE’s cooperation with the Georgian government on the draft of a 
new constitution.  
On the question of COE involvement in the region regarding minority rights, 
Georgia’s ratification and entry into force of the Framework Convention is relatively recent. 
Although it signed the document in 2000, Georgia did not ratify it until December of 2005 
and the law did not enter into force until April of 2006. Therefore, there has not been 
adequate time for the COE to assess Georgia’s compliance with the requirements of the 
Framework Convention (www.coe.int).  
Georgia receives funds from the EU as part of the EU’s neighborhood policy. The 
European Commission is the largest donor in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions 
(www.europa.eu) and its total contribution to the country as a whole from 1992-2004 equals 
420 million Euros.  
Prior to Georgia’s inclusion into the EU’s neighborhood policy in 2004, in 1996 the 
EU and Georgia agreed to a “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” (PCA). This 
agreement was the first step in Georgia’s integration into European Union institutions and 
convergence to European norms. The PCA commits Georgia to respecting democracy, 
human rights, international law, and market economy principles.  
The situations of Georgia and Romania are quite different. Romania was able to 
formalize its border with Hungary relatively early on in its effort to conform to western 
norms, and of course, as a condition to join European bodies. The formal resolution of 
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borders with Russia and with Armenia is something that Georgia still has not fully achieved. 
The presence of Russia as an imposing force in Georgian domestic politics is something that 
Romania did not have to deal with. In Romania’s dealings with its Hungarian minority the 
only major actors besides those that represented the Romanian or the Hungarian position 
were European organizations who offered mediating positions and whose credibility was 
enhanced by both Romania’s and Hungary’s desire to join the EU, and therefore meet the 
conditions that the EU had laid out for membership.  
Though it is beyond the scope of this essay to examine how and why Georgia has not 
reached a level of development to make it a serious candidate for EU membership, it is worth 
noting that conditionality for entry into NATO is playing a role in Georgia’s efforts to avoid 
war with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Economist, 3 August 2006). The Russian 
government has expressed displeasure at Georgia’s desire to join NATO and it would likely 
react in a similar fashion if Georgia seriously expressed interest in joining the EU.  
What we can therefore learn about EU involvement in Romania from the case of Georgia is 
that EU funding, presence, and role as a setter of norms (in cooperation with the OSCE and 
COE) is a necessary but not sufficient guarantor of peace, stability, and minority rights. In 
the case of Romania, though there were disagreements with the Hungarian government over 
the future of Transylvania in the early days of post-Communism, there was at least an 
outward desire on both sides to integrate into western European organizations. Such a desire 
to integrate into western organizations was taken less seriously in the Georgian case until the 
election of President Mikheil Saakashvili in early 2004. Romania and Hungary also did not 
(and do not) have to confront the contrasting interests of the Russian government in dealing 
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with their respective minority situations and desired western orientation.37 This absence of a 
force that is disruptive to regional stability allowed for the triadic relationship between 
European organizations (principally the EU), Romania, and Hungary to move forward. 
                                                 
 
37 For more on the Georgian perspective in the Autumn 2006 Georgia/Russia dispute, including a mentioning of 
Georgian cooperation with the OSCE to reduce conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia see Saakashvili, 
“Unprovoked Onslaught,” Wall Street Journal, 12 October 2006.  
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Conclusion:  
 
This examination of European involvement with the Hungarian minority in 
Romania, and the additional case of Georgia shows both the potential and limits of European 
organizations in their attempts to propagate the liberalization of rights throughout the 
continent.  
The case of Romania demonstrates that when both sides in a long-standing and bitter 
bilateral conflict are willing to allow a larger goal to supersede the conflict, then they can 
exploit the mediating role of a third party. In this case both Romania, along with Hungary, 
desired EU membership and were willing to let the EU, COE, and OSCE meddle in its 
minority rights legislation to ensure that it complied with inchoate European norms. The 
“active leverage”, and the “asymmetric interdependence” inherent therein, was so strong that 
in the end Romania allowed European bodies, who could not even entirely agree among 
themselves what “European norms” consisted of, to play a major role in shaping its minority 
rights legislation.  
Even if we conclude that the case of Romania is a success story for European level 
involvement in domestic affairs, this essay could leave the reader with two enduring 
questions: The first is simply, what about Georgia? European bodies have had a presence in 
Georgia for nearly as long as they have had one in Romania, and yet the conditions for 
Georgia’s population, and especially its minorities, are considerably worse than in Romania. 
This case shows the limits of European involvement in two ways.  
First, until early 2004, Georgia was arguably a democracy only in name. The 
overthrow of President Shevardnadze proves that the Georgian administration was gravely 
lacking in its ability to comprehend and address the needs of its own people let alone the 
concerns of European officials. This case therefore is evidence for another element of 
Vachudova’s argument: that the strength of domestic opposition is an important independent 
variable in determining the strength of a country’s reforms following Communism. We can 
extrapolate from this example that a country with weak domestic opposition, as Georgia was 
for its first decade following independence, will be less open to the suggestions of European 
bodies, or the allure of membership into European bodies, than a country with a stronger 
opposition.  
The case of Georgia also raises more troubling questions regarding the role of 
outside-state actors, in this particular case it is Russia that is cause for concern. Georgia 
cannot be a serious candidate for EU membership until it can reach a border agreement with 
Russia and can convince the Russian army to retreat out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This 
tense security situation essentially creates a stalemate situation where tension between the 
two states is bound to snowball into tension between ethnic peoples. Within this stalemate, 
international actors can play a role in keeping weapons down, but as long as serious tension 
exists, there can be no significant movement toward potential reconciliation and, in the case 
of the EU, a systematic cooperation between the EU and Georgia that would eventually result 
in accession for Georgia. Therefore we see that when a strong outside state exists that 
opposes a strong European presence, “active leverage” and many other forms of European 
level diplomacy are limited.  
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The second question that this essay could leave the reader with is the following: What 
happens to EU leverage once a country becomes a member of the EU, given that the tangible 
threat of exclusion no longer exists?  
This concern then raises the concept of “Europeanization.” In other words, has 
Romania transformed itself over the last decade and a half to a European country, and 
espousing the values that this entails, that it can function without the threat of exclusion from 
the EU entry queue resting over it?  
Since Romania has not yet acceded to the EU, it is too early to reach a definitive 
answer to this question.38 We can however still read trends and observe potential challenges.  
One the one hand, the trend is unequivocally positive. Relations between Romanians 
and Hungarians in Romania are, to all accounts, far better than they were a decade ago. The 
legal changes and accession to European norms discussed earlier show that a framework 
exists to ensure that Romanians and Hungarians can live together peacefully. The story of 
Babes-Bolyai University, the discussion of an emerging regional identity in Transylvania39, 
the reduction in popularity for extreme parties are all signs of a moderate and tolerant 
normative political discourse taking place in Romania. Therefore when we look only at 
Hungarians in Romania, it appears that “active leverage” and the conditionality connected to 
the EU-accession process has been a clear success.  
However Romania still faces further challenges with ethnic minorities, primarily with 
the Roma minority. This long-oppressed minority has only recently received special attention 
from the Romanian government and the European Union. The partly EU-funded “Decade for 
                                                 
 
38 The EU is addressing concern about post-enlargement compliance and “conditionality” by continuing to place 
conditions agricultural funds even once Romania joins the EU on January 1, 2007. 
 
39 See Saunders 2006. 
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Roma Inclusion” began in 2005 and seeks to improve the economic and educational 
condition of the Roma people. Much of this work will likely be completed after Romanian 
has joined the EU. To add to the challenge, many Romanian citizens still harbor deeply 
discriminatory beliefs about Roma.  
We can hope, however, that the positive opinion that an overwhelming majority of 
Romanian citizens hold for the EU (Eurobarometer 2003 cited in Vachudova 237) is not only 
shared by their political leaders, but also translated into a shared societal effort to improve 
the condition of the Roma minority. If Romania can successfully tackle this goal, then theirs 
will truly be a remarkable story of liberalization, tolerance, and inclusion that will inspire 
believers and convince skeptics that European bodies, and primarily the EU, through offering 
membership as the end goal, can create better lives for millions of Europeans through 
diplomatic means. 
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